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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature 0fthe

A.

case.

This case arises from the breach of a contract between the Plaintiff/Appellant Primera
Beef,

LLC

Primera ﬁled

its

Complaint and

Demand

for Jury Trial in

breached a contract that had been executed by the
B.

Ward

(“Primera”) and Defendant/Respondent Allan

which

(“Ward”).

it

On March

asserted a claim that

13,

2017,

Ward had

parties.

Course 0f Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition.

On March

13,

2017, Primera ﬁled

its

Complaint and

Demand

for Jury Trial in this matter.

(“Complaint”). Primera’s Complaint’s set forth one cause 0f action for Breach 0f Contract. R.,
pp. 0012-0015.

Primera’s Complaint asserted that

Ward

through his attorney had revealed the

terms of a conﬁdential Settlement Agreement t0 a third party

who was

not a party t0 the

Settlement Agreement. See R., pp. 0012-0015.

On May 3,

2018,

Ward ﬁled

a Motion for

Summary Judgment (“MSJ”)

seeking dismissal

0f Primera’s claim. See R., pp. 0034-0036. The District Court granted the motion for summary

judgment 0n July 20, 2018,
Defendants’ Motion for

setting forth

its

Summary Judgment

reasoning in
(“Decision”).

its

Memorandum

Decision Granting

See R., pp. 0095-0103. As

set forth

in the District Court’s Decision, the

motion for summary judgment was granted because of the

District Court’s determination that

Ward’s attorney was not acting within the scope 0f

authority

R., pp.

When he made

the disclosure of the conﬁdential terms of the Settlement Agreement.

0101—0102.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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On August 21,

2018, Primera ﬁled a Motion for Reconsideration. See R., pp. 0104-0105.

Primera sought reconsideration 0f the District Court’s opinion that Ward’s attorney was not
acting Within the scope of his authority

when he

Settlement Agreement. R., pp. 0106-0110.

On

disclosed the terms of the conﬁdential

September

13,

2018, the District Court denied

Primera’s Motion for Reconsideration, holding that although Ward’s attorney was representing

him

as criminal defense attorney at the time of the disclosure, the attorney

the scope of his authority

When he made

Judgment was entered

in favor

was not

acting within

the disclosure. See R., pp. 0120-0126.

0f

Ward 0n October

Primera timely ﬁled the Notice of Appeal in

this

matter 0n

24, 2018.

See R., pp. 0127-0124.

December

4,

2018.

An Amended

Judgment was ﬁled 0n December 27, 2018 and the Amended Notice 0f Appeal was ﬁled on

December

31, 2018. See R., pp. 0155-0156, 0157-0180.

Statement 0fFacts.

C.

The

facts in this matter are undisputed.

parties executed a Settlement

parties.

Agreement

Both

parties agree that in

November of 2016

in conjunction with a prior litigation

See R., pp. 0037-0038; Appeal Volume

1

— Conﬁdential

between the same

Exhibit pp. 0001-0011.

Settlement Agreement contained a conﬁdentiality clause. See R., pp. 0037-0038; Appeal

1

— Conﬁdential

Law

Firm, LLP. See R., pp. 0037-0038; Appeal

The

Volume

Exhibit pp. 0001-0002; 0008. Ward’s attorney for that prior civil matter

Keith Roark 0f the Roark

the

was R.

Volume

1

—

Conﬁdential Exhibit pp. 0001-0002. Mr. Roark also signed the Settlement Agreement as Mr.

Ward’s
t0

attorney. See R., p. 0038. After entering into the Settlement

Agreement Ward continued

engage Mr. Roark as defense counsel in a related criminal matter then pending

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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in Cassia

County. See R., pp. 0037-0038; Appeal

Volume

1

— Conﬁdential

Exhibit pp. 0001-0002.

After the Settlement Agreement had been executed, Mr. Roark communicated With the

Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney in an attempt to have the criminal charges against
dismissed. See R., p. 0038; Appeal

9,

2017 Mr. Roark sent a

detail the

Volume

letter t0 the

1

— Conﬁdential

Exhibit pp. 0001-0002.

Ward

On January

Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney Which disclosed in

terms of the Settlement Agreement. See R., pp. 0049-0053.

Ward

asserts that

he did not

speciﬁcally authorize Mr. Roark’s disclosure 0f the terms 0f the settlement. See R., Appeal

Volume

1

— Conﬁdential

Exhibit p. 0002,

1}

Primera maintains that the conﬁdential settlement

8.

terms were disclosed in the course 0f Mr. Roark’s legal representation 0f
the scope 0f Mr. Roark’s express authority t0 act

R., pp.

0n 0f behalf 0f Ward

Ward and

fall

within

in the criminal matter.

See

0069-0070; 0106-0109.

ISSUE PRESENTED

II.

Did

the District Court err

0f his authority

at the

by ﬁnding

that

ON APPEAL

Ward’s attorney was not acting within the scope

time he disclosed the terms 0f the conﬁdential Settlement Agreement?

III.

ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL

Appellant requests that costs be awarded pursuant t0 Idaho Code § 12-107. Additionally,

Appellant requests that attorney’s fees be awarded pursuant t0 Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and
pursuant to the underlying contract which provides for fees t0 the prevailing party. R.,

Conﬁdential Exhibit,

p. 8,

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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ARGUMENT

IV.

Standard 0fReview.

A.

“In an appeal from an order 0f

same

as the standard used

Lockheed Martin Corp.

v.

by

the

summary judgment,

trial

this

Court’s standard 0f review

court in ruling 0n a motion for

Idaho State Tax

Comm,

the

is

summary judgment.”

142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644

(2006). Rule 56(0) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that

summary judgment

“shall

be rendered forthwith

ﬁle, together With the afﬁdavits, if any,

and

that the

moving party

is

entitled t0 a

responding t0 summary judgment
her case at that time 0f
fact regarding the

v.

Idaho

Ins.

show

is

if the pleadings, depositions,

that there is

n0 genuine issue

and admission 0n

as t0

any material

fact

judgment as a matter 0f law[.]” However, the party

not required to present evidence on every element 0f his

summary judgment, but

rather

must

01‘

establish a genuine issue 0f material

element 0r elements challenged by the moving party’s motion. See Thomson

Agency, 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994).

“A11 disputed facts are t0 be construed liberally in favor 0f the non-moving party, and

all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-

moving

party.”

Robert Comstock,

1106, 1109 (2006).

LLC v. Keybank Nat’l Assoc,

142 Idaho 568, 571, 130 P.3d

“This Court freely reviews issues 0f law.” Soignier

322, 324, 256 P.3d 730, 732 (2011) citing Lattin

v.

1257, 1260 (2010).

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

-

4

_

Adams

v.

Fletcher, 151 Idaho

Cnty., 149 Idaho 497, 500,

236 P.3d

Court Erred in ﬁnding that Ward’s attorney was not acting within the
scope 0f his authority at the time he disclosed the terms 0f the conﬁdential Settlement
Agreement.

The

B.

District

This Court has previously held that the attorney-client relationship

is

a relationship of

agency, stating:

“The relationship between an attorney and client is one 0f agency” in which the
client is the principal and the attorney is the agent.” Muncey v. Children ’s Home
Finding and Aid Soc. OfLewiston, 84 Idaho 147, 151, 369 P.2d 586, 588 (1962).

An agent may bind a principal

if the

agent has actual authority. Actual authority

is

an agent 0r impliedly confers 0n an
and proper to achieve the object 0f the
express authority granted t0 the agent. Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708
P.2d 900, 902 (1985) (citing Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12, 501 P.2d 278,
280 (1972)).
that authority a principal expressly grants t0

agent because

Caballero

v.

it

is

usual, necessary,

Wilkse, 140 Idaho 329, 332,

The expression 0f “necessary,
fact in the

That

is

0f

to say,

Whether the action

their agent.

authority

usual,

and proper”

determining Whether or not an action

purpose of agency law
acts

92 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2004).

would be

is t0

is

falls

is

used by

this

Court t0

assist the trier

0f

within the scope of authority of an agent.

properly Within the scope of the representation. The very

hold principals accountable for the wrongful, negligent, or improper

T0 hold

that

an improper action takes the action outside of the scope 0f

to negate the entire

purpose 0f the law 0f agency.

Idaho Civil Jury Instructions 6.40.1 deﬁnes Agency

as:

“The term

‘agent’ refers t0 a

person authorized by another, called the ‘principal,’ t0 act for 0r in the place of the principal. The
principal

is

responsible for any act of the agent Within the agent’s scope 0f authority.”

The Idaho
“Conduct

is

Civil Jury Instructions also provide a deﬁnition for the scope 0f authority.

within the scope 0f the agent’s authority if it occurs while the agent

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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is

engaged

in the

duties that the agent

was asked or expected

perform and

to

relates t0 those duties.”

Idaho Civil

Jury Instructions 6.43.1. In this present matter Mr. Roark was communicating With the deputy
prosecutor as part 0f his express duty t0 represent

Ward

and those

in the criminal action,

communications related exclusively to that duty.
“It

is

not necessary that a particular act 0r failure t0 act be expressly authorized by

the principal t0 bring
the principal that

is

it

Within the scope 0f the agent’s authority. Conduct for the beneﬁt of

incidental t0, customarily connected With, 0r reasonably necessary for the

within the scope 0f the agent’s authority.”

Landvik

v.

Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 936 P.2d 697, 702, (Idaho App. 1997), emphasis added). This language

is

performance 0f such duties

is

directly in line With the present matter.

Ward

Mr. Roark, but gave him express authority
the prosecuting attorney. Mr.

his conduct

was

for the

Id. (citing

did not directly oversee every statement

t0 participate in

and conduct the communications With

Roark derived no personal beneﬁt from the communications and

beneﬁt of Ward, and

Ward

alone.

Mr. Roark’s duties as attorney for the accused

in a criminal matter naturally include

communicating with the prosecuting attorney regarding Defendant’s criminal matter.

Ward was

represented

made by

by counsel

in the criminal matter, the prosecutor

communicate only with Ward’s counsel and not with Ward

directly.

It

Because

was

legally

was

therefore, usual,

bound

to

necessary and proper for Mr. Roark t0 communicate with the Prosecuting Attorney 0n behalf of

Ward. There

is

n0 dispute

that

Mr. Roark was acting Within the scope 0f his agency during the

course of his communications with the Cassia County prosecutor.

Actions that are proper and usual under the course of the agency are done within the

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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umbrella of the agency. If a real estate agent were t0 represent his client in court that would be
outside of the proper scope 0f the agency of the real estate agent. If the real estate agent were t0

list

a piece of property and provide incorrect data to the buyer,

wrongful), but

still

within the scope 0f the agency. King

489 P.2d 1324, 1326 (197 1) (“Representations
been held

to

as t0

v.

it

would be improper

(or

H.J. McNeel, Inc. 94 Idaho 444, 446,

boundary 0r quantity 0f land have generally

be binding upon the principal even though no express authority existed giving the

agent authority t0

If a driver

make such representation”).
were

t0 list his

home

employer’s

for sale,

it

would be outside 0f

the proper

scope 0f the driver’s agency. If a driver negligently operates his employer’s vehicle, causing an
accident, that

is

a wrongful and improper action, but

it is

still

within the scope 0f the driver’s

agency. “The statements 0f an agent respecting the subject matter 0f an action and Within the

scope 0f his authority are binding 0n the principal.” Thornton

238 (1953). In Thornton, the Idaho Supreme Court held
the principal of the driver

passenger.

was held

The

v.

Budge, 74 Idaho 103, 257 P.2d

that a passenger in

an automobile was

where the driver was taking the passenger on a business errand

for the

driver in Thornton negligently caused an automobile accident and the passenger

liable for the

damages caused by the automobile

further found that the principal

was bound by

the statements

accident.

made by

the accident as the passenger’s agent. Thornton, 74 Idaho at 108,

The Whole purpose 0f the law 0f agency
conduct 0f the agent.

is

t0

Id.

The Thornton Court

the driver at the scene of

257 P.2d

at

241.

hold the principal accountable for wrongful

Idaho Civil Jury Instructions 6.40.1. There would be no purpose for the

body 0f law regarding agency

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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scope of the agency

itself.

Communicating With a prosecuting attorney
representing a criminal defendant.

is

clearly Within the proper scope

However poorly performed

the

communication might be does

not remove the communication from being Within the scope 0f the agency.

Mr. Roark while

communicating With the prosecuting attorney was acting exactly as expected
representation of Mr. Ward. Mr.

Ward

0f

t0

perform his

as the principal is responsible for the wrongful actions 0f

Mr. Roark taken during the course and scope of those communications.

manner

is

improper,

improper action as

it

remains Within the scope of the

Just as operating a vehicle in a negligent

principal

from responsibility for

authority. Similarly,

that

one does not stand over the shoulder 0f

it

does not excuse the

their attorney dictating

what the

attorney writes, but simply authorizes the attorney t0 communicate 0n their behalf.

attorney subsequently

to

makes a negligent 0r improper statement

communicate on behalf of the

client, the client is still

in the course

If the

of fulﬁlling his duty

responsible for the conduct of his

attorney as his agent.
“Litigants freely choose their attorneys and cannot avoid the consequences of the

attorney’s actions.” Devault

v.

Steven L. Herndon,

A

Professional

Assn” 107 Idaho

1, 3,

684

P.2d 978, 980 (1984) (citations omitted). In Devault the attorney repeatedly failed to comply
with orders from the court, resulting in a delay 0f trial and ultimately the dismissal 0f the action
altogether.

Those actions on the part of Devault’s attorney were clearly improper. However,

this

Court upheld the dismissal, stating that Devault could not avoid the consequences 0f his

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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Similarly, in the present matter, the impropriety 0f Mr. Roark’s actions

attorney’s action.

d0 not

take his actions outside of the scope of his authority.

The

District

Court in the present matter held that

it

was

the impropriety 0f Mr. Roark’s

conduct that removed the conduct from being within the scope 0f Mr. Roark’s authority,
“Implied actual authority comes from a general statement of What the agent

stating,

is

supposed t0 do; an agent is said to have implied authority to do acts consistent
with that direction.” Id. It is that authority “which is necessary, usual, and proper
t0 accomplish 0r perform” the express authority delegated t0 the agent by the
principal.

Under

Clarkv Gneiting, 95 Idaho

this

theory

Ward

10, 12,

501 P.2d 278, 280 (1972).

could only be liable for the actions 0f Roark that were

“necessary, usual, and proper” t0 accomplish the task expressly authorized

by

Ward, which was t0 represent him in the criminal matter. “Proper authority”
implied to carry out an express authority cannot be read as authority t0 d0

something improper in carrying out the express authority—such as disclosing the
conﬁdential terms 0f an agreement—and therefore forecloses liability imputed t0

Ward 0n the basis 0f an implied

authority theory.”

R. pp. 0124-0125

The

District Court’s reasoning clearly conﬂates the idea

scope” 0f authority with the propriety 0f the action

itself.

0f being “properly within the

While the action 0f disclosing

conﬁdential terms 0f the Settlement Agreement was an improper action,

it

was done Within

the

course and scope 0f Mr. Roark’s legal representation 0f Ward in the criminal matter. Therefore,
the principal, Mr.

Ward

APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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V.

For the reasons

CONCLUSION

set forth above, Plaintiff/Appellant

Primera Beef, LLC, respectfully

requests that the Court reverse the District Court’s decision granting Ward’s

Summary Judgment and remand
including but not limited t0

this

Motion

matter to the District Court for further proceedings

trial.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

9th

day of April, 2019.

IL-Lér;
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Larsen, LLP
Attorneysfor Plaintlﬂ/Appellant,

Primera Beeﬁ
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LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Ihereby

document

to

David

certify that

on April

9th,

2019,

I

caused a true and correct copy 0f the foregoing

be served upon the following person(s) in the manner indicated below:

T.

D
D
D
D

Krueck

ELAM & BURKE, PA
E

St, Ste 300
1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539

251

Front

PO Box

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Email

t0:

to:

Eﬁle/Eservice

dtk@elamburke.com

Ipw;
Kimberly
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L. Williams

